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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Appellee, : Case No- 900170-CA 
v. : 
JEFFREY GLORIOSO, : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction of possession of a 
controlled substance with the intent to distribute, a second 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) 
and (b) (1990), in the Fourth Judicial District Court in and for 
Juab County, the Honorable George E. Ballif, presiding. This 
Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. S 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1990). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD 
OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court 
correctly ruled that the arresting officer had a reasonable 
suspicion based on articulable facts to justify an investigative 
stop of defendant's vehicle. Because of the trial court's 
advantageous position in determining the factual basis for a 
motion to suppress, this Court will not reverse the trial court's 
factual evaluation unless its findings are clearly erroneous. 
State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), cert. 
granted, P.2d (Utah 1989). However, in assessing the 
trial court's legal conclusions based upon its factual findings, 
this Court applies a correction of error standard. Id. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
U.S. Const. Amend. IV: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
Utah Code Ann. S 77-7-15 (1990): 
Any peace officer may stop any person in a 
public place when he has reasonable suspicion 
to believe he has committed or is in the act 
of committing or is attempting to commit a 
public offense and may demand his name, 
address, and an explanation of his actions. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Jeffery Glorioso, was charged with 
possession of a controlled substance with the intent to 
distribute, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. S 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) and (b) (1990) (R. 9). Defendant filed a 
motion to suppress the evidence seized in a warrantless search of 
his vehicle (R. 30). Upon the trial court's denial of 
defendant's motion, defendant entered a plea of guilty pursuant 
to State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), thereby 
reserving his right to withdraw that plea should this Court rule 
in his favor on appeal (R. 74-78). Defendant filed a notice of 
appeal on November 17, 1989 (R. 88). 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On November 15, 1988 at approximately 1:00 p.m., 
Sergeant Paul Mangelson, a 22-year veteran of the Utah Highway 
Patrol, was operating a hand-held radar unit to check the speeds 
of vehicles traveling on 1-15 near Nephi, Utah (T. 15, 18, 19). 
He observed two vehicles traveling northbound and clocked the 
first vehicle at the speed of 70 miles per hour, five miles in 
excess of the posted speed limit of 65 miles per hour (T. 19-20). 
The second vehicle was maintaining the same speed and was 
following at a very close and unsafe distance, within 
approximately three car lengths of the first vehicle (Ld.). 
Mangelson pursued the vehicles; they both exited 1-15 at the 
South Nephi exit where they turned onto Highway 28 (T. 19). 
Sergeant Mangelson intended to stop both vehicles, but he was 
able to stop only the second vehicle (T. 20-21). He did observe 
that the first vehicle, the vehicle driven by defendant, was a 
gray Chevrolet Celebrity with Florida license plates (hereinafter 
referred to as defendant's vehicle) (T. 21). Mangelson also 
testified that he could see two individuals in defendant's 
vehicle (T. 54). 
The vehicle that stopped was a 1985 silver, Plymouth 
four door with Arizona license plates (hereinafter referred to as 
the Arizona vehicle) (T. 21). Upon stopping the Arizona vehicle, 
Mangelson advised the driver why he had been stopped and 
requested his driver's license and vehicle registration (T. 21-
22). One of the two passengers volunteered that he was the owner 
of the vehicle and produced a temporary sticker that showed he 
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was the owner of the car (T. 22-23). Both passengers also 
identified themselves, but neither had any form of identification 
(T. 22). 
As Sergeant Mangelson talked with the occupants of the 
Arizona vehicle, he could smell the odor of marijuana coming from 
the car (T. 23). Mangelson asked them if they had any drugs or 
guns in the vehicle, and when they replied "no," he requested and 
obtained consent to search the vehicle (T. 23-24; trial court's 
Ruling of September 8, 1989, ("Ruling") at 2) (a copy of the 
trial court's Ruling is attached hereto as Addendum A). Before 
searching the vehicle, Mangelson asked the three to exit the car 
and patted them down for weapons (T. 24). In so doing he found 
that one passenger had a $20 bill in his front pocket that was 
rolled tightly and had a white powder on it, which indicated to 
Mangelson that it had been used for the purpose of consuming 
cocaine (T. 24-25). All three also were carrying a large amount 
of currency, between $160 to $550 each (T. 24, 67). 
During a search of the vehicle's interior Mangelson 
found under the passenger seat a bag of marijuana and a cocaine 
sifter containing a small amount of white powder (T. 25). When 
questioned about these materials, all three individuals denied 
any knowledge about the sifter and marijuana (T. 26). Mangelson 
then advised them of their rights, placed them under arrest and 
called for backup assistance (Id.). While awaiting assistance, 
he continued to search the vehicle and found a loaded .357 Magnum 
in a duffle bag in the back seat of the car (Id.). He then 
opened the trunk where he found two spare tires, one of which 
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required four lug nuts while the other required five lug nuts (T. 
27, 30). Mangelson concluded that one of the tires could not 
possibly fit that vehicle (T. 35). 
Mangelson also found a suitcase with a tag bearing the 
name "Steven Gregory" attached to its handle (T. 26). That name 
did not match the names of any of the three individuals in the 
vehicle, and Mangelson asked if the owner of the suitcase was 
present (T. 32). The three responded "no," and indicated that 
they "had no idea" who Steven Gregory was (Id.). He then asked 
whether they were traveling with the other vehicle, and all three 
immediately responded, "no," and said they didn't know anything 
about the other car (T. 33). Mangelson opened the suitcase and 
within it found another .357 Magnum, speed-loaders, a long 
bladed, cold-steel knife and a garrote—a weapon described by 
Mangelson as a chain with handles on each end that is used to 
choke people (Id.. ) . 
At that point Trooper Randy Ingerman arrived as backup 
and Mangelson asked him to check the local business area for 
defendant's vehicle, which Mangelson had last seen headed south 
toward the nearby business area or to Levan (T. 34). Ingerman 
was unable to find defendant's vehicle in the business area and 
returned to the scene where Mangelson had stopped the Arizona 
vehicle (T. 37). 
Shortly thereafter, as the officers were preparing to 
transport the three occupants of the Arizona vehicle to the 
Public Safety Building in Nephi, defendant's vehicle passed by 
and continued northbound on 1-15 (T. 37-39). Mangelson told 
-5-
Ingerman that that was the vehicle he was looking for and that he 
was going to pursue and stop it, which he did (T. 39). 
Upon stopping defendant's vehicle, Mangelson first 
noted that the wheels on the car required five lug nuts and 
concluded that one of the spare tires in the Arizona vehicle 
would fit defendant's vehicle (T. 40). He then approached the 
driver, defendant Jeffery Glorioso, and requested a driver's 
license (T. 41). Defendant produced an Arizona driver's license 
(^d.). The passenger gave his name and also provided an Arizona 
driver's license (Id.). The name on the passenger's driver's 
license matched the name on the unclaimed suitcase that Mangelson 
had found in the Arizona vehicle (^d.). Mangelson asked 
defendant and passenger Steven Gregory if they were traveling 
with the other vehicle and they said they were not (Id.). 
Mangelson then asked Mr. Gregory why his suitcase was in the 
trunk of the other car, and Gregory then acknowledged that they 
were in fact traveling with the Arizona vehicle (T. 42). 
During his conversations with defendant and Mr. 
Gregory, Mangelson observed a "very strong odor" of raw marijuana 
coming from the vehicle (T. 43). He asked if there were any 
weapons in the car and sought permission to search the vehicle 
(Id.). Mangelson patted the two down for weapons and searched 
the interior of the vehicle but did not find anything (T. 44). 
At the hearing on defendant's motion to suppress, 
Mangelson testified that he obtained consent to search the 
vehicle but defendant testified that Mangelson did not ask for 
permission to search the car (T. 43, 89). Judge Ballif ruled 
that he would proceed on the basis that no consent was given and 
required the prosecution to establish probable cause to justify 
the search (T. 13, 43). 
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He then asked for a key to the trunk, and defendant said that 
they had rented the car in Arizona and were never given a key to 
2 
the trunk (Id*). Mangelson then removed the bottom portion of 
the back seat and confirmed that the trunk was full of marijuana 
(T. 44-45). 
Mangelson arrested defendant and Mr. Gregory (T. 45). 
Trooper Ingerman, having transported two of the individuals from 
the Arizona vehicle to the Juab County Jail, returned to help 
transport defendant and Mr. Gregory to the Public Safety Building 
(Id.). Defendant's vehicle was also taken to the Public Safety 
Building where a further search of the trunk revealed that it 
contained 153 pounds of marijuana packaged in large garbage bags 
(T. 45-48). 
At the hearing on defendant's motion to suppress the 
seized evidence, Mangelson testified to the reasons he stopped 
defendant's vehicle. He stated that he wanted to stop 
defendant's vehicle because he observed it speeding and when 
the two cars passed by him they appeared to be traveling together 
(T. 20). The two vehicles were traveling at the same rate of 
speed and in very close proximity; they both took the same exit, 
and they both turned south (T. 19-21). During a search of the 
vehicle that he initially thought was traveling with defendant's 
vehicle, Mangelson found drug paraphernalia, cocaine, 
marijuana, numerous weapons, two spare tires—one of which could 
not possibly have fit the stopped vehicle, and luggage that did 
Mangelson also testified at the hearing that he never was 
able to find a key to the trunk (T. 44). 
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not belong to any of the vehicle's occupants (T. 24-27, 34, 35, 
69, 74, 75, 78). Mangelson further testified that when Trooper 
Ingerman was unable to find defendant's vehicle in the nearby 
business area, his suspicions were strengthened because 
defendant's vehicle would have to have continued south toward 
Levan, which Mangelson considered to be unusual under the 
circumstances (T. 35). 
Mangelson also testified that he previously had 
encountered drug courier scenarios in which two vehicles were 
traveling together and that the purpose of the second vehicle is 
to protect the first vehicle, sometimes by deliberately breaking 
the law if a police officer is seen so that the car carrying the 
drugs can continue without being stopped (T. 35, 36, 76). He 
further stated that he had experienced cases in which drug 
couriers removed the spare tire, luggage and other materials from 
the trunk in order to make more room for contraband and that drug 
couriers are often heavily armed (T. 37, 75, 76). Finally, 
Mangelson testified that after considering all of the factors 
enumerated above, in light of his training and experience, he 
suspected that defendant's vehicle was involved in transporting 
contraband (T. 75, 76). Defendant offered no evidence rebutting 
Mangelson's testimony. 
The trial court found that "[t]aken as a whole, all 
these factors present substantial support for an articulable 
reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop" of 
defendant's vehicle (Ruling at 4). The court also found that the 
"link between the two vehicles, the drugs and firearms in the 
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first vehicle stop, and the odor of marijuana in the defendant's 
vehicle gave ample cause for search of the defendant's vehicle 
for contraband" (id. at 5). In denying defendant's motion to 
suppress, the trial court found that "the actions of Trooper 
Mangelson were proper in the stop, arrest, and search of the 
[defendant's] car" (Id.). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly denied defendant's motion to 
suppress because the investigative stop of his vehicle was based 
on a reasonable and articulable suspicion that defendant's 
vehicle was involved in illegal drug trafficking, and the 
subsequent seizure of marijuana was legally justified. 
ARGUMENT 
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying 
his motion to suppress evidence because Sergeant Mangelson did 
not have a reasonable and articulable suspicion to justify an 
investigative stop of his vehicle (Br. of App. at 5). In 
reviewing the trial court's ruling, this Court applies the 
following standard: 
In considering the trial court's action in 
denying defendant's motion to suppress, we 
will not disturb it factual evaluation unless 
its findings are clearlt erroneous. . . . 
The trial judge is in the best position to 
assess the credibility and accuracy of the 
witnesses' divergent testimonies. . . . 
However, in assessing the trial court's legal 
conclusions based upon its factual findings, 
we afford it no deference but apply a 
Mcorrection of error" standard. 
State v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), cert. 
granted, P.2d (Utah 1990). (citations omitted). But see 
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State v. Ashef 745 P.2d 1255, 1268-69 (Utah 1987); State v. 
Galleqosf 716 P,2d 207, 208-09 (Utah 1985); State v. Cole, 674 
P.2d 119, 122 (Utah 1983); and State v. Holmes, 774 P.2d 506, 
509-10 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (which suggest that the "clearly 
erroneous" standard applies to both the trial court's factual 
evaluation and its legal conclusion). Because defendant does not 
dispute the facts giving rise to the stopping of his vehicle, 
this Court need only assess the trial court's legal conclusion 
that the investigative stop of defendant's vehicle was 
constitutional. 
Under the fourth amendment, to lawfully stop a vehicle 
for investigatory purposes, an officer must have at least a 
reasonable suspicion that either the vehicle or an occupant has 
violated or is about to violate the law (i.e., a traffic 
regulation, or any applicable criminal law). Delaware v. Prouse, 
440 U.S. 648 (1979); State v. Gibson, 665 P.2d 1302, 1304 (Utah), 
cert, denied, 464 U.S. 894 (1983); State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 
880, 883 (Utah Ct. App.), petition for cert, filed, 135 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 78 (Utah 1990); State v. Holmes, 774 P.2d 506, 507 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989); State v. Baird, 763 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988). A stop of a vehicle is, of course, also 
justified when the officer has probable cause to believe either 
the vehicle or an occupant has violated the law. Delaware v. 
Prouse, 440 U.S. at 661, 663. 
The "reasonable suspicion" test was first articulated 
by the United States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 
(1968). There the Court held that when "a police officer 
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observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude 
in light of his experience that criminal activity is afoot," he 
may make an investigative stop to confirm or dispel his 
suspicion. .Id. at 30. A police officer who makes an 
investigative stop must be able to point to "specific and 
articulable f^cts which, taken together with rational inferences 
from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." Id. at 21. 
The Terry "reasonable suspicion" test has been codified in Utah 
Code Ann. S 77-7-15 (1990) which reads as follows: 
Any peace officer may stop any person in a 
public place when he has reasonable suspicion 
to believe he has committed or is in the act 
of committing or is attempting to commit a 
public offense and may demand his name, 
address, and an explanation of his actions. 
This Court has interpreted the reasonable suspicion 
test and concluded that a "brief investigatory stop must be based 
on 'objective facts' that the 'individual is involved in criminal 
activity.'" State v. Holmes, 774 P.2d 506, 508 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989) (citations omitted). As such, the central issue in the 
instant case is whether the trial court properly concluded that 
Sergeant Mangelson's investigative stop of defendant's vehicle 
was justified by a reasonable and articulable suspicion based on 
objective facts. 
Defendant asserts that Mangelson stopped his 
vehicle based on a "good chance" or "hunch" that it was traveling 
with the Arizona vehicle, a vehicle which Mangelson had 
already determined was involved in illegal activity. (Br. of 
App. at 4). Defendant's argument ignores the gradual manner in 
which Mangelson's suspicion arose and the specific facts 
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which led him to suspect that defendant's vehicle was involved 
in the transportation of contraband. Viewed in its proper 
context, the evidence presented at the hearing on defendant's 
motion to suppress clearly demonstrates that Mangelson 
had a reasonable suspicion that justified an investigative stop 
of defendant's vehicle. 
At the suppression hearing Mangelson detailed 
numerous factors that led him to stop defendant's vehicle. When 
Mangelson initially observed defendant's vehicle it was speeding 
and, had he been able to do so, Mangelson would have stopped 
3 
defendant's vehicle at that time (T. 19-21). The vehicle with 
Defendant asserts in his brief that Mangelson "testified 
that he did not stop the [defendant's] vehicle for the purposes 
[sic] of issuing a traffic citation" (Br. of App. at 7). That 
assertion distorts the record. Mangelson testified that the 
decision as to whether to stop a vehicle for traveling up to five 
miles over the speed limit was a matter of officer discretion (T. 
84). He also testified that he personally did not "always" issue 
a citation, and that sometimes he issues "a warning" (T. 74). 
During his cross-examination of Mangelson, defense counsel 
posed the following question: "[B]asically, you didn't stop 
. . . [defendant's] car for any traffic citation, did you?" (T. 
78). Mangelson answered, "I believe I just testified [to] my 
reasons for stopping it. He was speeding. He was doing 70. He 
had been doing 70 earlier. . . " (Ici. ). Mangelson went on to 
indicate that the fact that defendant was speeding was "part of" 
his reason for stopping defendant's vehicle (Id.). 
While much of the testimony provided at the hearing on 
defendant's motion to suppress concentrated on the question of 
whether there existed a reasonable suspicion to justify stopping 
defendant's vehicle to investigate for drug trafficking, 
Mangelson could have stopped defendant for speeding because he 
had clocked defendant's vehicle traveling at 70 miles per hour, 
five miles over the posted speed limit (T. 19). See Scott v. 
United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978) (holding that M[t]he fact 
that the officer does not have the state of mind which is 
hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification 
for the officer's action does not invalidate the action taken so 
long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify the 
action"). 
Mangelson did attempt to stop defendant's vehicle when he 
first observed it speeding (T. 19-21). He also testified that 
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which defendant appeared to be traveling was also speeding (T. 
19). Not only were the two vehicles maintaining the same rate of 
speed, but they were also traveling very close to each other, 
within approximately three car lengths (T. 19-20). The vehicles 
both exited 1-15 at the same point (T. 19). Both vehicles turned 
onto Highway 28 and both proceeded in the same direction (Id.). 
However, Mangelson did not at that point suspect that the two 
vehicles were transporting contraband. He intended to stop both 
vehicles because he had observed each committing traffic offenses 
(T. 20). When only the Arizona vehicle stopped, Mangelson was 
not able to pursue defendant's vehicle (T. 20-21). 
Defendant argues that the seizure of his vehicle 
"simply because it [was traveling] in close proximity to another 
vehicle, which [was] involved in illegal activity . . . " was 
unconstitutional (Br. of App. at 8). Defendant's assertion lacks 
merit because it is contrary to United States Supreme Court 
precedent and is based on a flawed analysis of the facts faced by 
Mangelson. In United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682 (1985), 
the United States Supreme Court found that where two vehicles 
appeared to have been traveling in tandem, law enforcement 
officials were justified in stopping both vehicles even though 
only one was believed to be carrying drugs. In the instant case, 
defendant's vehicle was not stopped simply because it was 
Cont. his observation of defendant's vehicle speeding played a 
role in his decision to stop the vehicle (T. 78). Consequently, 
should it choose to do so, this Court may dispose of this case on 
the grounds that the stop of defendant's vehicle was justified 
because Mangelson had previously observed it committing a traffic 
violation. 
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traveling in close proximity to another vehicle. Rather, 
the most critical facts which led Sergeant Mangelson to suspect 
that the two vehicles were traveling together and involved in 
criminal activity came to light when he investigated the Arizona 
vehicle. 
During a search of the Arizona vehicle, Mangelson found 
drug paraphernalia, cocaine, marijuana, numerous weapons, and 
luggage that did not belong to any of the occupants of the 
stopped vehicle (T. 25-27, 30, 35). The individuals in the 
Arizona vehicle not only denied any knowledge of the drugs and 
drug paraphernalia, but also said that they "had no idea" who 
Steven Gregory was even though a suitcase bearing his name was in 
the trunk of their car (T. 26, 32). The Arizona vehicle also was 
carrying two spare tires—one of which could not possibly have 
fit that car (T. 27, 30, 35). Finally, after Trooper Ingerman, 
Mangelson's backup officer, was unable to locate defendant's 
vehicle in the business area of Nephi, where one might reasonably 
have expected it to be, defendant drove past the scene where the 
Arizona vehicle had been stopped (T. 35, 37-38). As the Court 
said in Sharpe, "[p]erhaps none of these facts, standing alone, 
would give rise to a reasonable suspicion; but taken together as 
appraised by an experienced law enforcement officer, they provide 
clear justification to stop the vehicles and pursue a limited 
investigation." Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 682 n. 3. 
Mangelson analyzed the facts before him in light of his 
training and experience. See State v. Holmes, 774 P.2d at 508 
(officers are "entitled to assess the facts in light of [their] 
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experience") (quoting United States v. Briqnoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 
873, 885 (1975)). Mangelson had on prior occasions encountered 
drug courier scenarios where two vehicles had been traveling 
together (T. 35-36). He also had encountered cases in which drug 
traffickers removed the spare tire, luggage and other material 
from the trunk of the vehicle in order to make more room for 
contraband (T. 37, 75). Finally, Mangelson testified that drug 
traffickers are often heavily armed (T. 76). See State v. 
Dorsey, 731 P.2d 1085, 1092 (Utah 1986) (Zimmerman, J., 
concurring in the result) (officer "reasonably could assume that 
those participating in moving large quantities of illegal drugs 
over long distances might be armed to protect themselves from 
criminals who might attempt to 'rip-off a drug dealer"). All of 
these factors were apparent to Mangelson after he searched the 
Arizona vehicle. Based on his evaluation of the facts before 
him, Mangelson concluded that defendant's vehicle and the Arizona 
vehicle were acting in tandem to transport contraband (T. 75-
76).4 
Defendant would have this Court cast aside the 
cumulative weight of numerous facts as appraised by a highly 
trained law enforcement officer with over 22 years of experience 
While some of the factors relied upon by Mangelson to 
justify his investigative stop of defendant's vehicle may be set 
forth in a "drug courier profile," that does not alter this 
Court's analysis. See United States v. Sokolow, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 
1587 (1989) ("A Court sitting to determine the existence of 
reasonable suspicion must require the agent to articulate the 
factors leading to that conclusion, but the fact that these 
factors may be set forth in a 'profile' does not somehow detract 
from their evidentiary significance as seen by a trained 
agent•"). 
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in favor of a much narrower focus upon defendant's close 
proximity to another vehicle. That position reflects a 
fundamental misunderstanding of the reasonable suspicion test. 
As the United States Supreme Court reiterated in Sokolow, "[i]n 
evaluating the validity of a stop such as this, we must consider 
'the totality of the circumstances—the whole picture.'" 
Sokolow, 109 S.Ct. at 1585 (quoting United States v. Cortez# 449 
U.S. 411, 417 (1981)); see also, State v. Holmes, 774 P.2d at 509 
(indicating that the actions of police officers "are to be 
objectively assessed in light of all the facts and circumstances 
confronting the officers at the time"). Indeed, Terry itself 
involved "a series of acts, each of them perhaps innocent" if 
viewed separately, "but which taken together warranted further 
investigation." 392 U.S. at 22. In the instant case, the trial 
court recognized the Terry standard when it held that "[t]aken as 
whole, all of these factors present substantial support for an 
articulable reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop" 
of defendant's vehicle (Ruling at 4). 
Defendant also appears to argue that even if the 
initial stop of his vehicle was proper, once he provided 
Mangelson with his name and address pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-7-15 (1990), defendant should have been "free to go because 
there existed no reason whatsoever to detain him" (Br. of App. at 
10). Defendant failed to raise the issue of defendant's 
detention in his motion to suppress, and Utah appellate courts 
will not entertain on appeal an issue not properly raised below. 
State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660 (Utah 1985) ("[W]here a 
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defendant fails to assert a particular ground for suppressing 
unlawfully obtained evidence in the trial court, an appellate 
court will not consider that ground on appeal.") 
Should this Court address the merits of defendant's 
argument, it will see that defendant incorrectly applies the 
standard for constitutional detention as articulated in United 
States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512 (10th Cir. 1988), and applied by 
this Court in State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d at 884, and State v. 
Robinson, 140 Utah Adv. Rep. 16, 18 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). As 
stated in Marshall, the "question is whether . . . [the state 
trooper's] subsequent detention and questioning of . . • 
[defendant] was reasonably related to the initial traffic stop or 
was justified because . . . [the trooper] had a reasonable 
suspicion to believe . . . [defendant] was engaged in a more 
serious crime." ^d. at 884. See also Robinson, 140 Utah Adv. 
Rep. at 18. 
Defendant here was not detained solely because he had 
been observed speeding; defendant was detained because Mangelson 
"reasonably suspected" that he was transporting illegal drugs. 
The very strong odor of marijuana coming from defendant's 
vehicle, the presence of which defendant does not contest, and 
the presence of passenger Steven Gregory, which clearly linked 
defendant's vehicle to the Arizona vehicle, justified detaining 
defendant even after he had provided identification. Finally, 
defendant was arrested only after Mangelson confirmed that the 
trunk of his vehicle was full of marijuana, which clearly 
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established probable cause for his arrest. 
Defendant appears to argue that Mangelson lacked 
probable cause to arrest him but articulates no argument to 
explain why an allegedly illegal arrest would require exclusion 
of evidence seized (Br. of App. at 10-11). The question is 
wholly irrelevant to defendant's motion to suppress. The State 
did not seek to justify the warrantless search of defendant's 
vehicle based on the search incident to an arrest exception 
recognized in United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), and 
the trial court did not admit evidence or rule on that basis. 
Defendant's vehicle was searched pursuant to the 
automobile exception rule which was first developed by the United 
States Supreme Court in United States v. Carroll, 267 U.S. 132 
(1925). In Carroll the Court stated that, if reasonable and 
probable cause existed for believing that a vehicle contained 
contraband, an officer could search the vehicle for that 
contraband without a warrant. Id. at 153, 156. The Court has 
consistently held that a search warrant is not necessary where 
there is probable cause to search an automobile stopped on the 
highway because the car is movable, the occupants are alerted to 
the officer's intention to search the vehicle, and the car's 
contents may never be found again if a warrant must be obtained. 
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970). 
The Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Court of Appeals 
have recognized and applied the Carroll-Chambers doctrine. See 
State v. Shields, 28 Utah 405, 406; 503 P.2d 848, 849 (1972); 
State v. Limb, 581 P.2d 142 (Utah (1978); State v. Droneburg, 781 
P.2d 1303, 1305 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). In the instant case, the 
circumstances of the warrantless search fall squarely within the 
automobile exception. The vehicle was lawfully stopped on a 
highway, 1-15, and remained mobile. Defendant was alerted to 
Mangelson's intent to search for contraband, and defendant could 
have disposed of the evidence had he not been detained and his 
vehicle searched. 
Should this Court decide to reach the issue of whether 
there was probable cause to arrest defendant, several points 
warrant discussion. Defendant takes issue with what he 
characterizes as the trial court's holding "that once the 
identity of the [passenger] Steven James Gregory was established 
the officer had probable cause to arrest appellant Glorioso" (Br. 
of App. at 10). Although defendant does not cite to the record, 
the phrase to which he appears to be referring has been taken out 
of context. The trial court concluded that Gregory's presence in 
defendant's vehicle, along with Gregory's admission that they 
were travelling with the Arizona vehicle, enabled Mangelson to 
"positively link" the two vehicles (Ruling at 5). The trial 
court went on to conclude that "[t]he evidence found in the first 
car stopped was more than enough to justify the arrest of Mr. 
Gregory and Mr. Glorioso when the link between the two cars was 
made" (Id.). 
Even if this Court were to reject the trial court's 
conclusion, there are other grounds upon which it can rely to 
-18-
The evidence presented at the hearing on defendant's 
motion to suppress provided overwhelming support for the trial 
court's conclusion that there was a reasonable suspicion to 
justify an investigative stop of defendant's vehicle. The trial 
court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress the seized 
evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's conviction 
should be affirmed, 
DATED this /P day of September, 1990. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
JUDITH S.H. ATHERTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
Cont. find that there was probable cause to arrest defendant. 
See State v. Bryan, 709 P.2d 257, 260 (Utah 1985) (an appellate 
court "may affirm the trial court's decision on any proper 
grounds, even though the trial court assigned another reason for 
its ruling"). 
In the instant case, the fact that the trunk of 
defendant's vehicle "was full of marijuana," a fact that 
defendant does not contest, clearly established probable cause 
for arrest under Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-8(2) (1990) (T. 44). 
Furthermore, a recent decision from this Court suggests that 
there may have been probable cause for arrest once Mangelson 
detected the "very strong odor" of raw marijuana coming from 
defendant's vehicle, another fact that defendant does not contest 
(T. 43). See State v. Bartley, 784 P.2d 1231, 1236 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989) (holding that probable cause for arrest may arise from 
an officer's sense of smell and citing State v. Valenzuela, 121 
Ariz. 274, 589 P.2d 1306, 1307 (1979) (odor of marijuana). The 
evidence presented at the hearing on defendant's motion to 
suppress not only established that there was a reasonable 
suspicion to justify an investigative stop of defendant's 
vehicle, but also demonstrated that there was probable cause for 
the search of defendant's vehicle and for his arrest. 
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ADDENDUM A 
KCQ 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
M b '. : ' 
******* 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JEFFERY GLORIOSO and STEPHEN 
JAMES GREGORY, 
Defendant . 
Case Number 88-CR-0042 
88-CR-0043 
COURT OF APPEALS NO. 900170-CA 
Distr ict Crt. No. 185-D 
RULING 
* * * * * * * * 
This matter came before the Court on defendant's motion 
to suppress on the 8th day of August, 1989. Donald Eyre appeared 
for the State. Both defendants were present and represented by 
counsel. Defendant Gregory was represented by Mr. Robert 
Archuleta and defendant Glorioso was represented by Mr. Esparza. 
Witnesses were called and evidence was presented. The Court, 
having carefully considered all the evidence enters now its: 
RULING 
On 15 November, 1988, Utah Highway Patrol Sergeant Paul 
Mangelson was engaged in traffic patrol on Interstate Highway 15 
near Nephi in Juab County. He observed two vehicles traveJing 
northbound within three car lengths of each other. The officer 
determined, by radar, that the vehicles were traveling five miles 
per hour over the posted speed limit of 65. Trooper Mangelson 
began to pursue the vehicles; both of which took the South Nephi 
exit off the freeway. While the front vehicle did not stop for 
Mf 900)70 
Mangelson, he noted the color, that it had Florida plates, and 
two occupants. The second vehicle did stop for Mangelson. it 
had Arizona plates and three occupants. 
Mangelson advised the occupants of the stopped vehicle 
of the reasons for the stop and requested identification and 
registration information of the occupants. The occupants 
indicated they were traveling to Montana to visit friends but 
were unable to state who those friends were. As he talked with 
the occupants, Mangelson detected a strong odor of Marijuana. He 
asked if there was any drugs or firearms in the vehicle to which 
the occupants responded in the negative. Mangelson requested a 
search of the vehicle and the occupants consented. 
Search of the vehicle passenger compartment revealed a 
loaded pistol, and substantial amounts of cocaine and marijuana. 
The trunk contained two tires, at least one of which could not 
have belonged to the stopped vehicle and a suitcase with the name 
of Stephen Gregory on the handle. None of the occupants of the 
car was named Stephen Gregory. The suitcase contained some 
weapons, including a large knife and a loaded pistol. 
The sergeant requested a back-up officer to search the 
area for the front vehicle. The search was unsuccessful. After 
placing the occupants of the second vehicle in custody, Mangelson 
saw the front vehicle again, pursued it and stopped it. A 
request for identification revealed that the occupants were 
Jeffery Glorioso and Stephen Gregory here entitled defendants. 
Mangelson noted that one of the spare tires in the other vehicle 
would fit defendants' vehicle, Gregory admitted that they were 
traveling with the other vehicle to Montana to visit his father 
who was ill. Mangelson detected the smell of marijuana coming 
from the vehicle. His request for a search of the vehicle was 
apparently denied. Mangelson arrested the defendants and advised 
them of their rights. He subsequently searched the passenger 
compartment of the vehicle but found nothing and was unable to 
locate a key to the trunk. Removal of the back seat of the 
vehicle led to a stronger odor of marijuana. The car was removed 
to the public safety building where the trunk was searched. The 
trunk contained 153 lbs. of marijuana. 
This Court makes no determination as to whether the 
initial stop of the trailing vehicle was proper. Both the Utah 
Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court have held that 
a person has no standing to object to the search of property that 
the person does not own or otherwise have an interest in. Rakas 
v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978). State v. Iacono, 725 P.2d 1375 
(Utah 1986). See Also, State v. DeAlo, 748 P.2d 194 (Utah App. 
1987). In the instant case, the defendants have no possessory or 
ownership interest in the trailing vehicle. Therefore, the 
defendants have no legitimate expectation of privacy in that 
vehicle and have no standing to object to the stop or search. 
The Court therefore confines its analysis to the propriety of the 
stop and search of the front vehicle, and the arrest of the 
defendants. 
The initial stop of the defendants' vehicle was based 
on an articulateble and reasonable suspicion. In fact it would 
appear to a reasonable person that the vehicles were traveling 
together. They were in close proximity. They exited the freeway 
at the same point. The trailing car contained items that did not 
belong either to the car or the occupants therein (but, as was 
subsequently shown, did contain items belonging to Gregory). 
Furthermore, Mangelsonfs testimony was that drug couriers 
frequently remove spare tires and luggage from one vehicle to 
make space for the drugs. Drugs and firearms were found in the 
trailing vehicle. Taken as a whole, all these factors present 
substantial support for an articulateble reasonable suspicion to 
make an investigatory stop. 
Where there is a reasonable suspicion, making a stop to 
determine if a crime has been committed is not a seizure, as 
alleged by the defendants. Nor does it require Miranda warnings. 
The Utah Supreme Court has indicated that Miranda warnings are 
required only when a stop becomes custodial or the environment 
becomes accusatory. Salt Lake City v. earner, 664 P. 2d 1168, 
1170 (1983). The initial stop in this case involved the simple 
checking of identification and registration. This cannot be 
considered custodial nor accusatory. 
When the identity of one of the occupants was confirmed 
as being Stephen Gregory, Mangelson had probable cause necessary 
for arrest. While Mangelson had a reasonable suspicion necessary 
to stop the car, he did not have the probable cause necessary for 
arrest until he could positively link the occupants of the front 
vehicle to the following vehicle. This link was made when 
Mangelson was able to identify Stephen Gregory. The link was 
further solidified by Gregory's admission that the two vehicles 
were traveling together. The evidence found in the first car 
stopped was more than enough to justify the arrest of Mr. Gregory 
and Mr. Glorioso when the link between the two cars was made. 
The link between the two vehicles, the drugs and 
firearms found in the first vehicle stop, and the odor of 
marijuana in the defendants1 vehicle gave ample cause for search 
of the defendants1 vehicle for contraband. It is well documented 
that where such a vehicle retains a reasonable degree of 
mobility, search may take place without a warrant. United 
States v. Carroll, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). 
As to the subsequent search of defendants' vehicle 
after it had been removed to the custody of public safety 
building, both the Supreme Courts of Utah and the United States 
have upheld such a search without a warrant. In State v. Earl, 
716 P. 2d 803, 805 (1986) the Utah Supreme Court, citing the 
United States Supreme Court, held that if there is probable cause 
to search a vehicle at the scene, there is no search warrant 
requirement to search the vehicle after it has been impounded. 
That is what happened in this case. 
In light of the above-mentioned facts, the Court 
concludes that the actions of Trooper Mangelson were proper in 
the stop, arrest, and search of the car operated by the 
defendants, The motion of the defendants to suppress the 
evidence in this case is therefore denied. 
Dated this p day of September, 1989. 
BY THE COURT 
GEORGE £. BALL IF, JUDjSE 
cc: Robert Archuleta 
James Esparza 
Donald Eyre 
